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Comment
IN SEARCH OF GREENER PASTURES: DO SOLICITATION RULES
AND OTHER ETHICAL RESTRICTIONS GOVERNING
DEPARTING PARTNERS REALLY MAKE SENSE
TODAY?
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal profession, while once a gentlemanly tradition,1 has dra-
matically changed in the past century. For instance, in 1908, when the
American Bar Association (ABA) promulgated the Canons of Professional
Ethics2 in an effort to establish standards for the practice of law, competi-
tion was considered "an activity of merchants rather than [attorneys and
other] professionals."3 Today, however, lawyering is a lucrative and vigor-
ously competitive business. 4 Clearly, business development within the
1. See HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 211 (1953) (describing legal profes-
sion as "cherished tradition, the preservation of which [was] essential to the law-
yer's reverence for his calling").
2. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics (1908) (superseded 1970).
3. Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners: The Law and Ethics of
Grabbing and Leaving, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1, 7 (1988). Consistent with the view that
competition did not belong in the legal community, bar associations adamantly
sought to restrain competition. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE,
THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 378 (3d ed. 1994); see also
Audrey Shields, Note, Attorneys' Expanding Right to Advertise Under the First Amend-
ment, 26 How. LJ. 281, 288 (1983) (reporting that lawyers saw "the hustle and
bustle of competitive enterprise as being beneath their dignity").
4. See Sandra L. DeGraw & Bruce W. Burton, Lawryer Discipline and 'Disclosure
Advertising": Towards a New Ethos, 72 N.C. L. REv. 351, 378 (1994) ("Law is devolv-
ing from a profession to a business, or even a commodity, in the marketplace
. ...."); William H. Rehnquist, Dedicatory Address: The Legal Profession Today, 62 IND.
L.J. 151, 153 (1987) (noting that contemporary calculations indicated that corpo-
rate law firms billed $38 billion annually, filling significant economic role); see also
Ward Bower, Total Quality Management in Law Practice - It's Not Just for Business Any-
more, 39 PRAc. LAw., Apr. 1993, at 35 (providing methods for and discussing useful-
ness of incorporating business development and improvement programs into legal
practice); Jonathan M. Moses, Partners Losing Their Guarantee of Life Tenure, WALL
ST. J., July 14, 1992, at BI (recognizing transformation of firms into "large busi-
nesses that are far removed from their collegial roots").
There has been considerable commentary examining attorneys' need to gen-
erate business. See, e.g., Lewis B. Greenblatt, How to Handle Defections, NAT'L LJ.,
Aug. 5, 1991, at 20 (stating that inability of attorneys to acquire equity "creates the
need for them to economically exploit their talents and business connections as
much as possible during their highest income-producing years"); Rita HenleyJen-
sen, Attorney Goodwill Increases, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 23, 1991, at 1 ("In some states, a
lawyer's or a law firm's reputation is now worth cold cash."); Partnership Points:
Splitting the Take, ILL. LEGAL TIMES, June 1990, at 1 ("Bringing in business is the
(1517)
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legal profession has changed considerably since the turn of the century.5
In light of these changes, certain aspects of the Canons and their progeny
may not be fitting to the modern practice of law.6
The strained economic times of the 1980s and early 1990s brought
with them heightened competition in all types of businesses-including
the practice of law.7 As law firms began demanding more time and effort
from their employees, 8 a lawyer's sense of loyalty to one firm diminished
or faded altogether.9 Today, in fact, it is commonplace for associates as
well as partners to leave their law firms in the hopes of finding greater
opportunity elsewhere. 10
single most important contribution lawyers can make to their firms and to their
own money-making success ....").
5. See Robert Whitfield, Old Business Development Methods Don't Work Today: A
Management Plan Eases Firms into Marketing Program, ILL. LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 1993, at
13 (contrasting business development from two generations ago with those of to-
day and finding that law firms no longer can "wait for the telephone to ring" with
new business).
6. See generally Kirstan Penasack, Note, Abandoning the Per Se Rule Against Law
Firm Agreements Anticipating Competition: Comment on Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v.
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmICS 889, 892-93 (1992)
(noting that agreements anticipating competition would ameliorate problems at
dissolution and that balancing parties' interests best suits current legal practice
environment).
7. See Robert Whitfield, How to Manage a Legal Career in the Tumultuous 1990s,
ILL. LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 1994, at 10 (noting that throughout 1990s, "[t]he genteel
tradition in the legal profession had ended" and that contemporary legal profes-
sion is one of "brutal competition" and "increasing unpredictability").
8. See Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 151-52 (questioning whether law firms' treat-
ment of associates [i.e., requiring in excess of two thousand billable hours annu-
ally] is best for associates and, ultimately, society). In his article, the Chief Justice
observed that "[y]oung associates in large law firms today apparently work much
harder, and under significantly different conditions, than they did twenty-five years
ago." Id.
9. See Martin D. Pollack, Withdrawal Today: Big News Becomes Old News, in
WITHDRAWAL, RETIREMENT & DISPUTES: WHAT YOUR FIRM NEEDS TO KNoW 1, 3
(Edward B. Berger ed., 1986) (noting that due to attorneys' diminished sense of
loyalty, "[tlhese days switching firms is commonplace").
10. LEONA M. VOGT, FROM LAW SCHOOL TO CAREER: WHERE Do GRADUATES
GO AND WHAT Do THEY Do? 28 (1986). Although the number of associate depar-
tures are undocumented, Vogt examined random surveys of departures and con-
cluded that the average law school graduate remains in her or his first job only two
to five years. Id.
Likewise, Chief Justice Rehnquist, addressing partner mobility, noted that
"[p]artners in law firms have become increasingly 'mobile,' feeling much freer
than they formerly did and having much greater opportunity than they formerly
did, to shift from one firm to another and take revenue-producing clients with
them." Rehnquist, supra note 4, at 152; see also CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS § 16.2.3 (1986) ("Although employed rarely or never in some large
firms, lateral hires of partners or senior associates from other firms has become
somewhat more common.").
Furthermore, as noted by one article in the Georgetown Journal of Legal
Ethics:
Both clients and lawyers have increasingly become willing to break long-
standing ties to law firms. At the same time, those firms have had to grap-
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Such departures, commonly referred to as "split-offs," "breakups" and
"lateral hires,""l often result in bitter disputes over client solicitation is-
sues, especially when breakaway partners take a portion of the firm's clien-
tele. 12 Increased lawyer mobility has created difficulties in attempting to
ple with skyrocketing costs associated with computerization, inflated rents
and salary wars for top law school graduates. These changes have
ushered in the "Era of the Rainmaker."
Steven P. Handler, et al., The Ethics of Solicitation of Business from Corporate Clients, 5
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 423 (1991).
The media have repeatedly documented partner departures and resulting law
firm dissolutions. See, e.g., Steven Brill, The Partner Breakup Follies, AM. LAw., Mar.
1988, at 3 (discussing Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, and viability of non-competition
clauses); Brett Chase, A Sign of the Times? Gamble &Davis Breaks Up, Bus. REc.,July
25, 1994, at 3 (examining breakup of reputable firm and speculating whether simi-
lar dissolutions are likely to follow);- Martin Fox, 4 Lawyers Who Left L.I. Firm Barred
From Seeking Its Clients, N.Y.L.J., June 20, 1986, at 1 (presenting background of deci-
sion where court ordered injunction against "actively solicitring] clients"); Martin
Fox, Law Firm Sues Ex-Partners For Taking Clients With Them, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 3, 1980, at
1 (describing background and decision where court denied preliminary injunction
against lawyers. conducting business with clients of former firm); Mary Ann Ga-
lante, For Firms, Breaking Up Is Hard To Do, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 26, 1985, at 1 (docu-
menting firm breakups around country and discussing common problems
encountered with partner breakups and solicitation); Deborah Graham, Can Ugly
Litigation Be Avoided When Firms Undergo Divorce?, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 8, 1984, at 2
(giving background of three New York breakup cases); Coleman T. Mobley, Vener-
able Firm Torn Apart By Modern Pressures, LEGAL TIMES, May 26, 1986, at 6 (discussing
dissolution of Wall Street's Guggenheimer & Untermyer); Thorn Weidlich, Fees
Survive Firm's Split, Court Rules, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 31, 1994, at A6 (describing Califor-
nia appeals panel ruling that former partner owed part of contingency fees earned
in bad faith insurance case filed by ex-partner nearly two years after firm
dissolution).
11. See Vincent Robert Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients By Departing
Partners and Associates: Tort, Fiduciary, and Disciplinary Liability, 50 U. PrTT. L. REv. 1,
3 (1988) (referring to law firm departures as "split-offs" and "breakups"). In a
column entitled "Sidebar: Lateral Moves," the National Law Journal regularly re-
ports the movement of partners to lateral positions with other firms. See, e.g.,
Sidebar: Lateral Moves, NAT'L LJ., Aug.. 15, 1988, at 2 (noting attorneys' lateral
moves in Cleveland, Washington, DC, Los Angeles and New York City); see also
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An
Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L.
REv. 313, 386-89 (1985) (predicting that despite increased competition for lateral
hires from other firms, many large law firms will remain relatively stable); Nancy
Zeldis, Lateral Frenzy Over?, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 2 (discussing effect of chang-
ing economic conditions on frequency of lateral movements).
For purposes of this Comment, however, the terms "split-offs," "breakups" and
"lateral hires" will be used interchangeably to indicate attorney departure and, in
the case of a departing partner, to indicate firm dissolution.
12. See, e.g., Eleanor Kerlow, Messy Breakup' Takes Nasty Turn, LEGAL TIMES,
June 13, 1988, at 3 (describing how battle over division of assets, clients and files
between two well-known labor lawyers took on "the air of a contentious divorce"
after dissolution of their partnership); Tamar Lewin, When Law Partners Split Up,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1984, at D1 ("Some of the most bitter fights before the courts
these days are litigation over clients, funds and even office space that both the firm
and the departing partner or partners claim."); Douglas Linton, Loyal No Longer,
MANHATTAN LAW., Apr. 1, 1991, at 3 (interviewing former partner who took esti-
mated $5 million in client business after leaving firm).
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monitor attorney conduct, especially in the area of client solicitation.13 As
a result of the increased incidence of law firm dissolution, a tension has
developed between ethical responsibilities and issues of profit-making.1 4
Blind adherence to the traditional rules of ethics set forth in the Canons
and, subsequently, the Model Code and the Model Rules, threatens to
jeopardize the many interests involved.
The economic viability of firms from which attorneys depart, the free
flow of information to clients regarding selection of counsel,15 and, ulti-
mately, the prestige of the profession1 6 are all affected by the current con-
fusion over the proper interpretation of ethical rules applicable to
departure-based solicitation and the enforceability of restrictive covenants
in attorney partnership agreements. 17 Given speculation that attorney
13. SeeJohnson, supra note 11, at 8 (noting that growth of lawyer mobility has
caused little development in rules regarding departure-based solicitation). The
prevalence of firm breakups has caused commentators to re-examine the related
issue of attorneys' responsibilities toward other attorneys as well as their legal and
ethical obligations toward clients upon firm dissolution or breakup. See, e.g.,
Michael R. Robinson, When the Party is Over: Rights of Departing Attorneys to the Clients
of Their Former Firm, ILL. BJ. 552, 552 (1987) (reviewing tort, constitutional and
ethics considerations regarding departing attorneys' right to contact their clients).
Additional consequences of attorney mobility are the increasing destabiliza-
tion and the decreasing professionalism found within the profession. See, e.g.,
Greenblatt, supra note 4, at 20 (stating that lateral movement of upper-level attor-
neys presents greatest economic challenge to law firms today).
14. SeeJohnson, supra note 11, at 9 (noting that few courts and ethics commit-
tees have attempted to grapple with nuances of problems and those that have have
been criticized for their efforts). Partner withdrawal involves numerous ethics pro-
visions. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1980 [hereinafter MODEL
CODE], DR 6-101 (Competence), DR 2-110 (Withdrawal from Employment);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1992, [hereinafter MODEL RULES], Rule
1.1 (Competence), Rule 1.3 (Diligence), Rule 1.4 (Communication), Rule 1.16
(Declining or Terminating Representation).
While, in many instances, identical ethical concepts apply to both partners
and associates, permissible conduct with respect to solicitation may, in fact, differ
based upon the status of the attorney. SeeJohnson, supra note 11, at 14-15 (discuss-
ing differences between duties of partners and associates upon firm dissolution).
This Comment limits its focus to issues surrounding partner withdrawal. For a
general discussion of associate departures, see generally Johnson, supra note 11.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, recognizing the correlation between the '.'increase in
ethical difficulties" and the "structural changes in the profession" during the past
few decades, stated that, "[i]t is only natural ... that as the practice of law ... has
become organized on more and more of a business basis .... this practice should
on occasion push towards the margins of ethical propriety." Rehnquist, supra note
4, at 154.
15. For a discussion of how a literal reading of the ethical rules may defeat the
goal of providing clients with the freedom of informed choice regarding selection
of counsel, see infra notes 163-71 and accompanying text.
16. See John D. Feerick, Avoiding and Resolving Lawyer Disputes, in WITH-
DRAwAL, RETIREMENT & DISPUTES 7 (Edward B. Berger ed., 1986) (arguing that
dissention among attorneys damages reputation, tarnishes image of legal profes-
sion and harms third parties).
17. See generally Johnson, supra note 11, at 10 (recognizing "an almost total
lack of guidance" around ethics at attorney departure).
1520 [Vol. 40: p. 1517
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 5 [1995], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss5/5
1995] COMMENT 1521
mobility will only continue to rise, these issues must be addressed before
further damage befalls the legal profession.18
Law firms have attempted to deal with the concerns associated with
partner departure by incorporating restrictive covenants1 9 in partnership
agreements. 20 The restrictions imposed by such covenants range from rel-
atively minor financial disincentives to absolute prohibition from practic-
ing law within a certain geographical area for a stated time period.21 The
vast majority of courts, however, have refused to enforce restrictive cove-
nants in lawyer partnership agreements.22 These courts have applied a
virtual per se rule banning the use of restrictive covenants based on a strict
and somewhat constrained interpretation of the ethical rules applicable to
attorneys.23 By doing so, the courts have not considered the practicality of
such a rule in light of the unique issues confronting the modern legal
practitioner.
18. See Mark A. Cohen, Lawyers Warned on Fiduciaty Duty to Ex-Firms, MASS.
LAW. WKLY., May 10, 1993, at 3, (predicting that attorney mobility will continue to
grow as result of changing perception of law from craft to business); Graham, supra
note 10, at 2 (stating that lawyers "have discarded qualms about hiring lateral part-
ners"). But see Robert L. Nelson, The Changing Structure of Opportunity: Recruitment
and Careers in Large Law Firms, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 109, 125 (noting that
turnover among partners is low).
19. E. ALLAN F A NSWORTH, CoNrRAcrs § 5.3, at 356 (2d ed. 1990). Restrictive
covenants have long been disfavored by United States courts. Id. Reflecting the
courts' general disfavor of restrictive covenants, the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts permits such restraints only in limited circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 187, 188 (1981) (discussing non-ancillary and ancillary
restraints on competition); see also FARNswoRTH, supra at 356 (stating that restric-
tive covenants will be upheld only if reasonable).
Restrictive covenants (also called noncompetition restrictions) are enforced if
they are deemed to be reasonable. FARNSWORTH, supra. Several factors must be
considered in making this determination, including the legitimate interests of the
promisee, the burden on the promisor and the interests of the public. Id.
20. Steven Brill, The Partner Breakup Follies, AM. LAw., Mar. 1988, at 3 (report-
ing that approximately half of firms contacted for article on partnership withdraw-
als incorporated some type of restrictive covenant in their partnership
agreements); Penasack, supra note 6, at 891. The fact that many firms rely on
restrictive covenants suggests that many partners consider the covenants to be a
reasonable and efficient means to allocate assets and liabilities upon dissolution of
the partnership. Brill, supra. It may likewise suggest that the reason for such wide-
spread use of restrictive covenants is ignorance of ethical standards banning them.
Id.
21. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 499 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.) (ana-
lyzing restrictive covenant that prohibited departing partner from representing "a
client designated as that of another partner" for five-year period) affd, 348 A.2d
208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410,
410-11 (N.Y. 1989) (analyzing restrictive covenant that denied departing partner
agreed-upon share of net profits upon dissolution of partnership if partner "prac-
tice [d] law in any state or other jurisdiction in which the Partnership maintains an
office or any contiguous jurisdiction").
22. For a discussion of the majority view of restrictive covenants in lawyer part-
nership agreements, see infra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
23. For a list of cases employing this rationale, see infra note 123 and accom-
panying text.
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Notwithstanding the overwhelming majority view of adherence to a
virtual per se ban on attorney restrictive covenants, a persuasive minority
position is evolving.2 4 This minority view, which refuses to impose an arti-
ficial distinction between attorneys and other professionals, equitably bal-
ances the interests of the client, the law firm and the public,25 concluding
that some restrictive covenants are enforceable. 26 Indeed, one court indi-
cated that the abolition of the per se rule was entirely appropriate given
the "sweeping changes" in the legal profession.2 7 Such a view, upholding
restrictive covenants, offers a pragmatic as well as an ethical solution to the
problems associated with law firm dissolution and partner breakups. 28
This Comment critically analyzes the ineffectiveness of the various
ethical obligations imposed upon departing attorneys concerning client
solicitation in light of the evolution occurring within the legal profession.
Part I discusses pertinent ethical rules, highlights leading cases and scruti-
nizes the proffered rationales underlying each decision.2 9 Given the cur-
rent reality that a law firm operates, in large part, as a business, Part II
questions the continuing viability of the rigid departing partner solicita-
tion rules and virtual per se prohibition of restrictive covenants in attorney
partnership agreements.3 0 Ultimately, this Comment concludes that,
given the increased economic and competitive pressures of the modern
law practice, the professional rules of conduct must be re-examined, giv-
ing careful attention to an attorney's interest in practicing law and, of
course, to a client's right to a truly informed choice of counsel. 3 1
24. See, e.g., Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 160 (Cal. 1993) (holding that
"an agreement among partners imposing a reasonable cost on departing partners
who compete with the law firm in a limited geographical area.., is not void on its
face as against public policy"); Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Court, 234
Cal. App. 3d 963, 971 (1991) ("We find no reason to treat attorneys differently
from professionals . . .for example, by holding that lawyers may not enter into
non-competition agreements."). For a discussion of the emerging minority view,
see infra notes 140-56 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Petition of Felmeister & Isaacs, 518 A.2d 188, 204 (N.J. 1986)
("Everything we know about the administration of justice and the representation
of clients convinces us that rational selection of counsel serves not only the client's
interest, but [also] the public interest.").
26. For a discussion of the minority's equitable balancing, see infra notes 140-
56 and accompanying text.
27. Howard, 863 P.2d at 160.
28. Id. (arguing that typical balancing test applicable to other professions is
appropriate for attorneys).
29. For a discussion of relevant ethical rules and leading cases interpreting
them, see infra notes 33-160 and accompanying text.
30. For a discussion and analysis of the feasibility of applying a per se ban on
restrictive covenants in attorney partnership agreements, see infra notes 161-88
and accompanying text.
31. For a proposed re-examination of relevant ethical rules, see infra notes
187-88 and accompanying text.
1522 [Vol. 40: p. 1517
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Ethical Obligations Governing Attorney Solicitation
Much of the commentary surrounding solicitation has had all the trap-
pings of a medieval morality play. Lawyers generally emerge as either
heroes or villains in plots that rarely thicken enough to admit any narra-
tive complexity. All too often, the result has been a rhetorical standoff
that fails to capture the competing values at issue.3 2
Legal ethics is in somewhat of a state of transition. No uniform set of
rules governs the entire legal profession. In the early 1970s, the ABA's
1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code) served as
the basis for rules in virtually every jurisdiction.3 3 In 1983, however, the
Model' Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) superseded the
Model Code as a statutory model.3 4 Although more than half of the states
have adopted the Model Rules, many did so only after substantial modifi-
cation.3 5 As a result, the applicable set of ethical rules differs greatly, de-
pending on the jurisdiction and the specific subject matter.3 6 Discussion
of the ethical rules, therefore, requires consideration of the Model Code,
the Model Rules and local variations.
1. The Model Code
The Model Code does not expressly prohibit all forms of competition
among attorneys or prevent an attorney from leaving a firm and, subse-
quently, taking the firm's clients.3 7 Courts traditionally, however, have
interpreted ethical rules as prohibiting, or at least severely limiting, client
32. Johnson, supra note 11, at 46-47 (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Solicitation,
36J. LEGAL EDUC. 317, 318 (1986)).
33. Id. at 18. Following the American Bar Association's (ABA) adoption of
the Model Code, every jurisdiction enacted similar codes, with slight modifica-
tions. Id.; see generally WoLFRAM, supra note 10, § 2.6.3, at 56-57 (discussing enact-
ment of 1969 Code and referring to it as "an impressive and quick success").
34. MODEL RULES, supra note 14, at viii. But seeJohnson, supra note 11, at 18
(recognizing that Model Code serves as persuasive authority, even though
superseded).
35. Johnson, supra note 11, at 18. For example, three states have incorpo-
rated the substance of some provisions in the Model Rules into hybrid codifica-
tions based on the Model Code. See LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(ABA/BNA) 1:3 (1987) [hereinafter ABA/BNA MANUAL] (discussing ethical codes
of various jurisdictions).
36. See WOLFRAm, supra note 10, § 2.6.6, at 62-63 (noting that it "is clear that
the Model Rules will not be accepted in the states in the same uniform way that the
Code of Professional Responsibility was accepted fifteen years earlier").
37. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 458 (1977) ("[lit ap-
pears that the ban on solicitation by lawyers originated as a rule of professional eti-
quette rather than as a strictly ethical rule.") (emphasis added); see also DRINKER,
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solicitation by attorneys.38 Consistent with precedent, the Model Code
permits law firms and departing lawyers to notify present or former clients
of "new or changed associations."3 9 The Model Code requires that such
notice be in the form of a "brief professional announcement card" or a
similar "dignified" letter.40 Authorities have made it clear that language
38. 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 486, 512 (1985).
Hazard and Hodes recognized that under the Model Code, as interpreted by many
courts, attorneys were virtually prohibited from advertising. Id. To that point, they
wrote:
The [Model] Code also prohibited statements that were "self-laudatory"
and "undignified." These standards virtually negated the legitimacy of
truthful advertising for advertisements are inherently self-laudatory and
are "undignified" to those who believe that professionals should not ad-
vertise at all. In any event, those standards were disapproved by the
Supreme Court in Bates.
Id. For a discussion of the Bates decision, see infra notes 75-86 and accompanying
text.
39. MODEL CODE, supra note 14, at DR 2-102. In line with the Model Code,
early ABA Ethics Committee opinions permitted departing partners to announce a
change of employment. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Griev-
ances, Informal Op. 910 (1966) (declaring that departing attorney may, "upon
leaving the firm[,] send announcements to clients with whom he has had personal
contact through the firm advising them of the change, without elaboration").
With respect to the acceptable content of attorney announcements, the Model
Code instructed the following:
[The formal announcement] shall not state biographical data except to
the extent reasonably necessary to identify the lawyer or to explain the
change in his association, but it may state the immediate past position of
the lawyer. It may give the names and dates of predecessor firms in a
continuing line of succession. It shall not state the nature of the practice,
except as permitted under DR 2-105.
MODEL CODE, supra note 14, at DR 2-102(A) (2).
40. MODEL CODE, supra note 14, at DR 2-201(A). The Model Code further
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate or
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate in the use of any
form of public communication containing a false, fraudulent, misleading, decep-
tive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim." Id. at DR 2-101 (A); see also MODEL
CODE, supra note 14, at DR 2-102 (requiring that professional cards, announce-
ment cards and "similar professional notices" be "in dignified form" in order to
avoid discipline).
Based upon the "dignified" standard, the ABA gave its approval of the follow-
ing letter, comprised of only the most basic facts:
Dear [Client]:
Effective [date], I became the resident partner in this city of the XYZ
law firm, having withdrawn from the ABC law firm. My decision should
not be construed as adversely reflecting in any way on my former firm. It
is simply one of those things that sometimes happens in business and
professional life.
I want to be sure that there is no disadvantage to you, as the client,
from my move. The decision as to how the matters I have worked on for
you are handled and who handles them in the future will be completely
yours, and whatever you decide will be determinative.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1457 (1980).
In upholding the letter, the committee stressed the following factors: "[a.] the
1524 [Vol. 40: p. 1517
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 5 [1995], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss5/5
tending to induce a client to discharge a former firm's representation is
entirely inappropriate and impermissible under the Model Code's
standards.
4 1
2. The Model Rules
The Model Rules do not contain a provision similar to that found in
the Model Code. 42 Generally, the Model Rules are less restrictive than the
Model Code in defining the permissible scope of attorney communica-
tions to prospective clients. 43 The Model Rules, however, do provide limi-
tations on permissible solicitation. 44 For example, Model Rule 7.3 states,
in pertinent part, that: "A lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone
contact solicit professional employment from a prospective client with
whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship when a
significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary
gain."45
The United States Supreme Court interpreted certain Model Rules'
restrictions on client solicitation to be unconstitutional. 46 For example,
the Court ruled that the targeted direct mail provision of Model Rule 7.3
was unconstitutional in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass 'n.47 Indeed, decisions
such as Shapero indicate support for virtually unrestricted written commu-
nications with prospective clients.
48
notice does not urge the client to sever relationship[s] with the lawyer's former
firm and does not recommend the lawyer's employment... and [b.]. the notice is
brief, dignified, and not disparaging of the lawyer's former firm." Id.
41. SeeJohnson, supra note 11, at 21 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1457 (1980)).
42. Id. at 22. Unlike the Model Code, the Model Rules neither distinguish
between in-person communications and mailings nor directly limit the content
and audience of formal written announcements of attorney withdrawal. Rather,
the Model Rules target restrictions primarily at direct contact with potential cli-
ents. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 14, Rule 7.3 ("A lawyer shall not by in-person or
live telephone contact solicit professional employment from a prospective client
w.. When the significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary
gain.").
43. See HARRYJ. HAYNSWORTH, EXPANDING YOUR PRACIcrE: THE ETHICAL RiSKS
71 (1984) (characterizing Model Rules as "liberal"); Lori B. Andrews, The Model
Rules and Advertising, 68 A.B.A. J., 808, 808 (1982) (stating that then-proposed
Model Rules "offer a new, less restrictive approach to lawyer advertising than does
the current Model Code of Professional Responsibility").
44. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 14, at Rules 7.1, 7.3 & 7.5 (establishing re-
strictions on attorney solicitation).
45. Id. at Rule 7.3.
46. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988) (holding that
targeted, personalized and persuasive attorney solicitation by letter may not be
proscribed by state law); In reR.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (holding that attor-
ney advertising that is neither false nor misleading may not be proscribed under
First Amendment).




May: In Search of Greener Pastures: Do Solicitation Rules and Other Et
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
3. Local Authorities
Given the conflicting standards in the Model Code and the Model
Rules, the precise scope of permissible client solicitation by departing
partners continues to be a subject of contention and concern.49 Local
authorities charged with analyzing ethical dilemmas have applied a
number of conflicting approaches to this problem. For instance, some
authorities have held that a lawyer may not contact a client unless the
lawyer had a personal relationship with that client.5 0 Other jurisdictions
allow contact with all clients from a former firm.51 Some states deny an
attorney the opportunity to advise their clients of the right to choose their
own counsel, 52 while others allow lawyers the opportunity to provide such
49. See, e.g., Chicago Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 83-
2 (1983) (departing attorney should be permitted to send written communication
to present and former clients of law firm announcing his or her departure); Flor-
ida Bar Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 84-1 (1984) (concluding that attorneys
may notify client of their withdrawal from firm, but may not solicit response from
client regarding handling of client's files); Idaho State Bar Comm. on Ethics, For-
mal Op. 108 (1981) (deciding that attorney may notify clients of departure but can
not solicit their business); State Bar of Texas Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 422
(1984) (finding duty owed as result of attorney-client relationship allows attorney
to notify clients of withdrawal from firm); see also PRAcTICING LAW INSTITUTE, LEGAL
ETHICS, EVERYrHING A LAWYER NEEDS TO KNOW AND SHOULD NOT BE AFRAID TO ASK
246-47 (1988) (suggesting that after separation from firm, lawyers may communi-
cate with clients, but not prior to departure).
50. See, e.g., ABA Informal Op. 681 (1963) (deciding that attorneys may send
announcements of their withdrawal only to their personal clients, not to firm
clients).
51. See, e.g., Iowa State Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics and Conduct, Op.
80-40 (1980) (determining that upon dissolution, all firm clients may be notified
by mail and given choice of attorney).
52. See, e.g., Florida Bar Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 84-1 (1984) (con-
cluding that attorney may notify client of withdrawal from firm, but may not solicit
response from client or provide further information regarding handling of client's
files).
1526 [Vol. 40: p. 1517
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information. 53 Finally, some authorities require that the attorney-client
contact be only in writing. 54 Still others allow for telephone contact.55
Courts have also attempted to settle this issue. In doing so, some
courts have examined the issue in terms of whether the client "belongs to"
the law firm or to the departing partner.56 Such an "ownership" approach
is problematic, however, because clients are not assets subject to posses-
sion or "bartering."57 Rather, clients are free to hire counsel of their
choosing and they retain the absolute right to discharge their lawyers, with
or without cause. 58 As demonstrated earlier, however, neither the Model
53. See, e.g., State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility
& Conduct, Formal Op. 1985-86 (1985) (deciding that attorneys have duty to no-
tify client so that client can make "informed choice of counsel"); Illinois State Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 84-13 (1985) (departing attorney
may inform clients of their right to choose who will represent them); State Bar of
Wis. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 80-18 (1981) (stating that attorney may
send notice of change of employment and notice may inform client that client has
right to choose future representation, but may not urge or recommend attorney's
employment).
54. See Chicago Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 83-2
(1983) (declaring that departing attorney should be permitted to send written
communication to present and former clients of law firm); Iowa State Bar Comm.
on Professional Ethics & Conduct, Op. 80-40 (1980) (determining that upon disso-
lution attorneys may notify clients by mail, but may not contact clients personally).
55. See, e.g., Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Comm., Op. 80-94
(1980) (stating that attorneys leaving firm, who will not be soliciting clients' busi-
ness, may notify clients by phone of their departure).
56. See, e.g., Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoffv. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175,
1181-85 (Pa. 1978) (referring to clients and their respective files as property of
departing attorneys' former firm), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 907 (1979). For a general
discussion of property rights issues upon termination of attorney-client relation-
ship with regard to client file and information contained therein, see Brian J.
Slovut, Note Eliminating Conflict at the Termination of the Attorney-Client Relationship:
A Proposed Standard Governing Property Rights in the Client's File, 76 MINN. L. Riv.
1483, 1484 (1992) (concluding that attorneys should have ownership rights in
notes and intraoffice communications and that clients should have ownership
rights in remainder of file).57. See DRINKER, supra note 1, at 189 (noting that clients are not merchan-
dise); see also Dwyer v. Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 499 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.) (citing
DRINKER, supra note 1, at 189) ("A lawyer's clients are neither chattels nor mer-
chandise, and his practice and good will may not be offered for sale."), aff'd, 348
A.2d 208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); Missan v. Schoenfeld, 445 N.Y.S.2d 856,
859 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (ruling that partner has no "property right" in clients because
clients select counsel of their own choosing); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics,
Formal Op. 300 (1961) (holding restrictive covenant invalid because it constituted
inappropriate attempt to "barter in clients" that would be inconsistent with con-
cepts of professional status); cf WoLFRAM, supra note 10, § 16.21, at 879-80 ("A
client's files are not subject to sale or other voluntary or involuntary transfer be-
cause they belong to the client and'not to the lawyer.").
58. See, e.g., Ellerby v. Spiezer, 485 N.E.2d 413, 416 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)
("[C]lients of... [a dissolving] partnership ... [are] free to be represented by any
member of the dissolved partnership or by other attorneys of their choice."); Res-
nick v. Kaplan, 434 A.2d 582, 588 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) ("[A] client has the
right to elect the attorney he prefers, 'and... a member of a firm can not force
himself upon a client of the firm merely because he is a member of that partner-
11
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Code nor the Model Rules provide definitive assistance in resolving this
dilemma, with both emphasizing attorney-client, rather than firm-client,
relationships. 59 As a result, courts, left to their own predilection, have at
times produced curious decisions.
A recent illustration of the property or "ownership" approach to attor-
ney solicitation is found in Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Ep-
stein.60 In that case, a group of associates left a larger law firm to establish
their own firm.6 1 Immediately upon leaving their former firm, the associ-
ates contacted certain clients, predominantly via the mails, concerning the
clients' legal representation. 62 Ultimately, the court found the associates'
conduct to be an "improper" self-recommendation and to be damaging
both to the firm and to its clients. 63 Finding that the attorneys acted in
ship."' (quoting Platt v. Henderson, 361 P.2d 73, 85 (1961))); see also ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 910 (1966) (deciding that
no ethical problem exists in representing ex-clients of former firm because "it is
for the client to decide who will represent [him or her]"); ABA Comm. on Profes-
sional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 10 (1926) (reasoning that client's right
to discharge one attorney and to hire another is rooted in "litigant's right to be
represented at all times by counsel of his own selection"); Chicago Bar Ass'n
Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 83-2 (1984) (deciding that allocation
of ongoing cases at termination of attorney's employment "should not be deter-
mined at the 'insistence' of the affected attorneys but according to the preference
of the concerned clients").
Both the Model Code and the Model Rules require attorney withdrawal upon
discharge by the client. MODEL CODE, supra note 14, at DR 2-110B (providing that
lawyer "shall withdraw from employment ... if: (4) he is discharged by his client");
MODEL RuLEs, supra note 14, Rule 1.16 ("[A] lawyer ... shall withdraw from the
representation of a client if: (3) the lawyer is discharged."). Even a contract claim-
ing to bind a client remains terminable at the will of the client. See id. at 1.16 cmt.
(stating that "[a] client has a right to discharge a lawyer at anytime, with or without
cause, subject to liability for payment for lawyer's services").
59. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 14, at Rule 1.1 (requiring attorney, rather
than firm, to provide competent representation of client); see also id. at Rules 1.6,
1.7, 1.8, 1.9 and 5.1 (speaking in terms of attorney obligations as opposed to firm
obligations); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 300 (1961) (stating
that "[the] relationship between attorney and client are personal and individual
relationships"). But cf ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, In-
formal Op. 1428 (1979) (determining that "[a] client employs the legal services
office as a firm and not a particular lawyer").
60. 393 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 907 (1979).
61. Id. at 1177.
62. Id. at 1177-78. Although some contacts were made in-person or by phone,
most were made by letter. Id. A sample letter contained the following informa-
tion: confirmation of a recent conversation; termination of the lawyers' associa-
tion with the firm; advice regarding the client's right to choose his or her own
counsel; confirmation of the client's prior expressed desire to retain the author of
the letter; and identification of enclosed documents facilitating choice of counsel
to be sent to Adler, Barish and to the author. Id. at 1178.
63. Id. at 1184. Seemingly more concerned with the adverse affect on the
firm rather than the clients, the court stated that the associates' conduct "adversely
affected more than the informed and reliable decision-making of Adler, Barish
clients with active cases. Their conduct also had an immediate impact upon Adler,
Barish." Id. (emphasis added).
1528
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contravention of the "rules of the game,"64 the court enjoined the attor-
neys from making further communications with the former firm's clients
other than by means of the formal announcements permitted under the
Model Code. 65
The validity of the Adler, Barish court's opinion is questionable in light
of the established principles of client choice and the constitutional protec-
tion granted to attorney speech.6 For example, the Adler, Barish court
characterized clients previously represented by Adler, Barish as the firm's
prOperty.6 7 This idea, that a client "belongs" to an attorney or law firm, is
repugnant to the rule that the client has an absolute right to determine
who will represent him or her.68 Indeed, the Adler, Barish court's categori-
cal conclusion that clients represented by a firm's attorneys are thereby
clients of the firm goes too far. 69
64. Id. at 1184-85. The "rules of the game" to which the Adler, Barish court
referred are indefinite standards for regulating attorney conduct. Cf Mark D.
Flanagan, Comment, Lateral Moves and the Quest for Clients: Tort Liability of Departing
Attorneys for Taking Firm Clients, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1809, 1831 (1987) (criticizing use of
vague standards such as "rules of the game").
65. Adler, Barish, 393 A.2d at 1186. The Adler, Barish court analogized the
facts presented in the case before them to those in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447 (1978). Id. The Adler, Barish court found that the associates' conduct
of corresponding with their former firm's clients "frustrates, rather than advances,
Adler, Barish clients' 'informed and reliable decisionmaking."' Id. at 1181. The
egregious "ambulance chasing" conduct involving the in-person solicitation set
forth in Ohralik, however, hardly represents the conduct of the Adler, Barish associ-
ates; rather, the Adler, Barish associates' conduct more closely typifies the targeted
mail communications expressly determined by the Supreme Court to be constitu-
tional. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 472 (1988); Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 648 (1985).
66. See, e.g., Hillman, supra note 3, at 24-25 (criticizing decision of Adler, Bar-
ish court stating, "particularly with respect to the mailings that the court found so
offensive . . . the . . . court's facile dismissal of the associates' claims of constitu-
tional protection may well reflect a different era's 'rules of the game"').
67. Adler, Barish, 393 A.2d at 1184.
68. WoLFRAM, supra note 10, § 16.2.3, at 888. As one commentator stated:
Attempting to resolve the issue [of unfinished partnership business] by
referring to clients as "files" and debating which lawyer "owns," or to
which lawyer a client "belongs" obscures and distorts the client-lawyer re-
lationship. The compelling fact is that the client-lawyer relationship is
personal; clients should accordingly have a free choice of counsel. The
best way to accommodate interests that pull in sometimes conflicting di-
rections is to permit clients to make their own choice but to penalize
lawyers who employ methods of gaining clients that overreach the clients,
breach fiduciary obligations to other partners during the existence of the
partnership, or falsely disparage former colleagues.
Id.
69. Hillman, supra note 3, at 30. At first blush, this idea seems in line with
general partnership, contract or tort law that maintains that a client represented
by an attorney at a firm actually is a client of the partnership, rather than a client
of the particular lawyer actually consulted. See, e.g., Corti v. Fleisher, 417 N.E.2d
764, 768 (Ill. App. 1981) ("It is fundamental that the employment of one member
of a law firm is the employment of all whether all are specially consulted or not,
except where there is a special understanding to the contrary."). The Adler, Barish
13
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The Adler, Barish opinion is flawed in another context. In setting
forth its rationale, the court stated that, without supplemental communi-
cation with any attorneys, the client alone must ascertain the ability to termi-
nate current legal representation and to secure other counsel.70 Clearly,
an uninformed client-a layperson uneducated in the law-cannot be ex-
pected to unilaterally realize all possible consequences and implications of
a firm breakup. Such a determination sounds more akin to a strategic
decision to be made by attorneys after careful study and considerable con-
templation. By placing such an onerous burden on the unsuspecting cli-
ent, the Adler, Barish decision fails to adequately protect and advance the
concept of client-informed choice-a goal the court apparently sought to
achieve. 7 1
As discussed, the ethical rules governing the practice of law are far
from uniform. 72 Whether they are modelled after the Model Code or the
Model Rules, the area of client solicitation involves consideration of many
issues and remains a confusing area with which to deal. This confusion is
evidenced by the conflicting decisions of local ethics committees. 73 The
United States Supreme Court, however, has decided a line of cases in the
context of the First Amendment. 74 These cases provide some guidance as
to constitutionally permissible restrictions on client solicitation by
attorneys.
court's admonitions of the associates' conduct however, completely ignore the
idea of client choice and, in fact, seem to support the idea that clients are indeed
property to be bartered. See Adler, Barish, 393 A.2d at 1177 ("No case on the list...
was [the associates']. Rather, each case was an Adler, Barish case on which [the asso-
ciates] were working.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 907 (1979). The
concurrence to the intermediate appellate court's opinion dramatizes this point:
It is noble and daring to embark on a career of law by cutting the umbili-
cal cord that ties one to an employment contract. But taking the heart
and soul of the benefactor is immoral, illegal and repulsive. If they want
their own firm, let them get their own clients.
Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 382 A.2d 1226, 1233 (Pa.
Super. 1977) (Spaeth, J., concurring), rev'd, 393 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1978) (emphasis
added).
70. Adler, Barish, 393 A.2d at 1189.
71. Id. at 1181 (stating that the withdrawing associates' conduct "frustrates,
rather than advances, Adler Barish clients' 'informed and reliable decisionmak-
ing'"); id. at 1184 (indicating that withdrawing associates' conduct "adversely af-
fected.., the informed and reliable decisionmaking of Adler Barish clients with
active cases").
72. For a discussion of the Model Code and the Model Rules, see supra, notes
33-48 and accompanying text.
73. For a discussion of conflict rulings of local ethics committees, see supra,
notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
74. For a discussion of the First Amendment cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court, see infra notes 75-100 and accompanying text.
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B. Attorney Solicitation and the First Amendment
1. Written Solicitations
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona75 marked the Supreme Court's initial ex-
amination of the interplay between the First Amendment and ethical rules
prohibiting attorneys from soliciting clients. In Bates, the Court an-
nounced an attorney's right under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments76 to advertise truthfully the prices of routine legal services. 77
In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected several arguments as-
serted by the State. 78 First, the State argued that lawyer advertising would
adversely affect professionalism. 79 Rejecting this contention, the Court
found the asserted nexus between attorney advertising and the feared
downfall of the legal profession to be "severely strained."8 0 Next, the State
alleged that attorney advertising was inherently misleading.8' The Court
refused to accept this argument as well, responding that "[i]f the naivete
of the public will cause advertising by attorneys to be misleading, then it is
the bar's role to assure that the populace is sufficiently informed as to
enable it to place advertising in its proper perspective."8 2 Several addi-
tional arguments were offered by the State, including an assertion that
75. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
76. Id. at 353. The First Amendment was made applicable to the states under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939). Although the Bill of Rights is not entirely applica-
ble to the states, those rights deemed to be "fundamental" to a just system of gov-
ernment are made applicable to the states. Id. With regard to this issue, the Court
has stated that "[f] reedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are pro-
tected by the First Amendment from infringement by Congress, are among the
fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment from invasion by state action." Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444,
450 (1938).
77. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384. Note, however, that the attitude against competi-
tion through advertising still existed at the time Bates was heard, as evidenced by
the 5-4 decision of the Court. Id. at 352.
78. Id. at 368-70, 372, 376, 377-79.
79. Id. at 368.
80. Id. Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun acknowledged that attorneys
practice law to earn a living. Id. As support for this claim, the Court recounted
appellee's statement at oral argument: "We all know that law offices are big busi-
nesses, that they may have billion-dollar or million-dollar clients, they're run with
computers, and all the rest. And so the argument may be made that to term them
noncommercial is sanctimonious humbug." Id. at 368 n.19.
81. Id. at 372.
82. Id. at 375. The Court recognized the problems created by a blanket pro-
hibition against attorney advertising:
In fact, it has been suggested that the failure of lawyers to advertise cre-
ates public disillusionment with the profession. The absence of advertis-
ing may be seen to reflect the profession's failure to reach out and serve
the community: Studies reveal that many persons do not obtain counsel
even when they perceive a need because of the feared price of services or
because of an inability to locate a competent attorney.
Id. at 370 (citations omitted).
1995] 1531
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lawyer advertising was undignified.8 3 The Court countered this notion
with its observation that other professionals advertise without incurring
any loss of dignity or respect.
84
Following the Bates decision, forty-five states and the District of Co-
lumbia revised their ethical codes to allow attorney advertising.85 Because
many states continued, however, to find attorney advertisements distaste-
ful, as a practical matter, many rules allowed no more than was expressly
required under Bates.
8 6
Five years after Bates, the Court extended similar constitutional pro-
tections for more targeted written communications by attorneys.8 7 The
holding of In re RM.J precludes a state from prohibiting or restricting the
contents of legal advertisements unless such advertisements are found to
be false or misleading.8 8 Although states are constitutionally permitted to
regulate misleading speech, the Court emphasized that they must do so
"with care and in a manner no more extensive than reasonably necessary
to further substantial [governmental] interests."89 Commentators have
suggested that the /M.J decision indicates the Court's unwillingness to
permit needless restrictions on the content of attorney advertising.
90
83. Id. at 375-79 (including arguments based on: adverse effect on adminis-
tration of justice; undesirable economic effects of advertising; adverse effect of ad-
vertising on quality of service; and difficulties of enforcement).
84. Id. at 369-70. In fact, the Court explained: "[I]t has been suggested that
the failure of lawyers to advertise creates public disillusionment with the profes-
sion.... Indeed, cynicism with regard to the [legal] profession may be created by
the fact that it long has publicly eschewed advertising." Id. at 370-71 (footnotes
omitted).
85. Roger P. Brosnahan & Lori B. Andrews, Regulation of Lawyer Advertising: In
the Public Interest, 46 BROOK. L. REv. 423, 426 n.19 (1980). For an examination of
how various states revised their rules after the Bates decision, see id. at 426-34.
86. Id. at 426-34. Although states could no longer impose a per se ban on
attorney advertising, many of them established restrictions that were intended to
limit attorneys' use of their newfound right to advertise. Id.
87. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
88. Id. at 203. Specifically, the Court stated that "[truthful advertising re-
lated to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment." Id.
89. Id. at 207. The Court went on to state that, "[tihe absolute prohibition on
[the attorney's] speech, in the absence of a finding that his speech was misleading,
does not meet these requirements." Id.
90. See Shields, supra note 3, at 304 ("In re R.M.J. inspires hopes that the Court
is prepared to pull the legal profession into the modern world."); see also Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
765 (1976). In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, the Court stated:
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is
nonetheless dissemination of information as to who is producing and sell-
ing what product, for what reason, and at what price. So long as we pre-
serve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our
resources in large measure will be made through numerous private eco-
nomic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of
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The Court continued to expand the scope of permissible attorney
communications in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel91 In this opin-
ion, the Court again rejected a rule mandating dignified advertising.92
The Court found that any state rule prohibiting attorneys from soliciting
or accepting employment through truthful and non-deceptive advertise-
ments containing information or advice about a specific legal problem vio-
lates the First Amendment.93 The Court required a more substantial evil
than mere "bad taste" or lack of dignity to justify an absolute ban on attor-
ney communications.94
Finally, in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n,95 the Supreme Court sup-
ported virtually unrestricted written communications between attorneys
and prospective clients by holding that the targeted direct mail provision
of Model Rule 7.3 was unconstitutional. 96 Although these attorney solici-
tation cases permit states to regulate communications in order to protect
consumers from deception, each holding flatly rejects overly broad restric-
tions on written communications targeting prospective clients. 97
91. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
92. Id. at 647. The Court expressed its sentiments as follows: "[T]he merepossi-
bility that some members of the population might find advertising embarrassing or offensive
cannot justify suppressing it. The same must hold true for advertising that some
members of the bar might find beneath their dignity." Id. at 648 (emphasis
added).
93. Id. ("An attorney may not be disciplined for soliciting legal business
through printed advertising containing truthful and nondeceptive information
and advice regarding the legal rights of potential clients.").
94. Id. at 648. Specifically, the Court stated:
[W]e are unsure that the State's desire that attorneys maintain their dig-
nity in their communications with the public is an interest substantial
enough to justify the abridgment of their First Amendment rights. Even
if that were the case, we are unpersuaded that undignified behavior
would tend to recur so often as to warrant a prophylactic rule.
Id.
95. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
96. Id. at 472. Rule 7.3 of the Model Rules provided:
A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective cli-
ent with whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relation-
ship, by mail, in-person, or otherwise, when a significant motive for the
lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain. The term "solicit" in-
cludes contact in person, by telephone or telegraph, by letter or other
writing, or by other communications directed to a specific recipient, but
does not include letters addressed or advertising circulars, distributed
generally to persons not known to need legal services of the kind pro-
vided by the lawyer in a particular matter, but who are so situated that
they might in general find such services useful.
MODEL RuINs, supra note 14, at Rule 7.3. The Shapero majority held that
"[c] ommercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not concern unlawful
activities... may be restricted only in the service of a substantial governmental
interest, and only through means that directly advance that interest." Shapero, 486
U.S. at 472 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 638
(1985)).
97. See, e.g., Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472 (stating that state rules "'may be no
broader than reasonably necessary to prevent the' perceived evil" (quoting In re
17
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2. In-Person Solicitation
In contrast to mailed communications, in-person solicitation involves
direct and personal contact with prospective clients and presents different
concerns, such as an invasion of the client's privacy, overreaching and un-
due influence by the attorney.98 Due to the fact that attorneys are trained
in the art of persuasion, traditional solicitation standards have prohibited
efforts taken by attorneys to secure employment through personal con-
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982))); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638 (holding that restric-
tion must serve substantial governmental interest and only through means directly
advancing that interest); In reRM.J., 455 U.S. at 203 (ruling that any restriction on
attorney speech must be "narrowly drawn" and the State may regulate "only to the
extent regulation furthers the State's substantial interest"); Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 365 (1977) (finding blanket suppression of attorney advertis-
ing unlawful, "serv[ing only] to inhibit the free flow of commercial information
and to keep the public in ignorance").
98. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641 ("In-person solicitation by a lawyer . . . [is] a
practice rife with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy and outright
fraud.") (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464-65 (1978)).
Overreaching and undue influence are the feared results of personal contact be-
tween an attorney and an unsuspecting and unsophisticated layperson. This con-
cern is illustrated in the following passage: "The Rule [against solicitation] is
designed to protect the layperson from the importuning of a lawyer in a direct
interpersonal encounter where the layperson may feel overwhelmed and 'have an
impaired capacity for reason, judgment and protective self-interests."' ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 85-1515 (1985)
(quoting MODEL RuLEs, supra note 14, Rule 7.3 cmt); see also Shapero, 486 U.S. at
476 (recognizing similarly increased likelihood for abuses or mistakes with regard
to direct-mail solicitation); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457 ("Unlike a public advertise-
ment, which simply provides information and leaves the recipient free to act upon
it or not, in-person solicitation may exert pressure and often demands an immedi-
ate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or reflection.");
WoLRAm, supra note 10, § 8.11.1, at 479 ("Business relationships with clients are
beset with conflicts of interest and will often involve situations in which the lawyer
occupies a dangerously superior bargaining position.").
After stating that "the mode of communication makes all the difference," the
Shapero Court observed the alternatives which could prevent overreaching, at least
in the context of direct mail solicitation:
[M]erely because targeted, direct-mail solicitation presents lawyers with
opportunities for isolated abuses or mistakes does not justify a total ban
on that mode of protected commercial speech. The State can regulate
such abuses and minimize mistakes through far less restrictive and more
precise means, the most obvious of which is to require the lawyer to file
any solicitation letter with a state agency, giving the State ample opportu-
nity to supervise mailings and penalize actual abuses.
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has cited other
possible risks that might result from in-person client contact, such as increased
litigation, increased fraudulent claims and a demeaning of the legal profession.
Ruth Fleet Thurman, Direct Mail: Advertising or Solicitation? A Distinction Without a
Difference 4-5 (1982); see also Deborah L. Rhode, Solicitation, 36J. LEG. EDuc. 317,
319-21 (1986) (describing how underrepresentation, overreaching misrepresenta-
tion, overcharging and intrusiveness have historically been associated with attorney
solicitation).
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tact.9 9 Accordingly, the Supreme Court upheld a categorical ban on in-
person solicitation for purposes of pecuniary gain in Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n.10 0
3. Justice O'Connor's Dissenting Views
In both Shapero and Zauderer, Justice O'Connor authored dissenting
opinions. In each, Justice O'Connor expressed her view that the interest
in keeping the practice of law "professional" is a sufficientjustification for
the restrictions imposed by the states.10 1 She felt that the specialized
training and education in the law may "confer[ ] [upon an attorney] the
power and the temptation to manipulate the system of justice for one's
own ends."1 0 2 In fact, under Justice O'Connor's paternalistic approach,
rigid ethical proscriptions against attorney advertising are absolutely nec-
essary to prevent overreaching and other abuses by attorneys.' 0 3 Based
purely on her desire to preserve the legal profession as "a genuine profes-
sion," Justice O'Connor called for the, continuation of "fairly severe con-
straints on attorney advertising."10 4
99. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465. For example, with respect to client solicitation,
the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics took a strong position, announcing that
"[a] duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the
Bar having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immedi-
ately to inform thereof, to the end that the offender may be disbarred" CANONS, supra
note 2, at Canon 28 (emphasis added); see also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics
and Grievances, Formal Op. 111 (1934) ("From earliest times, both in England
and in America, solicitation of employment by lawyers has been considered be-
neath the essential dignity of the profession."); Deborah T. Landis, Annotation,
Modern Status of Law Regarding Solicitation of Business By or For Attorney, 5 A.L.R.4TH
866, 870-72 (1980) (concluding that these rules bar any personal contact between
departing attorney and clients of attorney's former firm for purposes of represent-
ing clients).
100. 436 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1978).
101. See, e.g., Shapero, 486 U.S. at 489 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[S]pecial
ethical standards for lawyers are properly understood as an appropriate means of
restraining lawyers in the exercise of the unique power that they inevitably wield in
a political system like ours."); Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("The States understandably require more of attorneys than of others engaged in
commerce. Lawyers are professionals, and as such they have greater obligations."
(emphasis added)).
102. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 489 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 490 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In her dissent in Shapero, Justice
O'Connor stated that "ordinary legal prohibitions against force and fraud, are sim-
ply insufficient to protect consumers of their necessary services from the peculiar
power of the specialized knowledge that [attorneys] possess." Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
104. Id. at 491 (O'ConnorJ., dissenting). Nowhere in her opinions doesJus-
tice O'Connor elaborate on what is meant by the term "profession" or what spe-
cific authority requires attorneys to be held to a more stringent standard than
other professionals-such as doctors or accountants.
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C. Restrictive Covenants and Ethical Rules
Although the public perceives the partnership form of organization
as fairly simple and straightforward, dissolution of such an arrangement
presents rather complex issues.10 5 Seemingly, a partnership could avoid
problems associated with dissolution by simply including in its partnership
agreement a restrictive covenant prohibiting withdrawing partners from
competing with the firm. Many courts, however, have held that legal eth-
ics create a per se ban on the use of restrictive covenants among lawyers
for these purposes. 106
The history of this per se ban on restrictive covenants is a relatively
short but tumultuous one. Prior to 1961, cases and other authorities ad-
dressing restrictive covenants between lawyers were sparse. 10 7 But, in
1961, the American Bar Association Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility voiced strong opposition to such agreements. 10 8 Relying
primarily on Canon 7 of the Professional Canons of Ethics, which pre-
cludes a lawyer from encroaching on the business of another lawyer, 10 9
the Committee viewed noncompetition covenants as an unacceptable
form of bartering in clients and inconsistent with a lawyer's professional
status. 110 In the Committee's opinion, such agreements constituted a per
se ethics violation.11 1 The ABA Committee offered three rationales for its
conclusion: (1) because clients are not merchandise, they cannot be bar-
tered among lawyers; (2) lawyers should have the right to practice wher-
ever they please; and (3) because ethical rules prohibit a lawyer from
105. See generally UNIF. PARTNERSHiP AcT § 6, 6 U.LA. 1 (Supp. 1985) (discuss-
ing obligations of partners upon firm dissolution, including winding up of firm
business). For a detailed discussion of the relevant implications of firm dissolution
under the Uniform Partnership Act, see Hillman, supra note 3, at 30-57.
106. See, e.g., Dwyer v.Jung, 348 A.2d 208, 208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975)
(holding restrictive covenant void as against public policy); In re Silverberg, 427
N.Y.S.2d 480, 482 (N.Y. 1980) (holding restrictive covenants incompatible with
professional status of attorneys).
107. See Dwyer v.Jung, 336 A.2d 498, 501 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975) (not-
ing that "[r] eported cases [addressing lawyer restrictive covenants] are almost non-
existent"), aff'd, 348 A.2d 208 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975).
108. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 300
(1961).
109. CANONS, supra note 2, Canon 7. Canon 7 provides that "efforts, direct or
indirect, in any way to encroach upon the business of another lawyer, are unworthy
of those who should be brethren at the Bar." Id.
110. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 300
(1961). ("It is unethical for a lawyer employing another lawyer to include as part
of the employment contract a restrictive covenant prohibiting the employee from
practicing law in the city and county for two years after the termination of employ-
ment."). The Committee so held despite any express prohibition in the Canons.
A literal reading of the Canons suggests only that covenants imposing an outright
ban on competition are unethical.
111. Id. It is significant that the Committee described the practice of law as a
profession, not a business or commercial enterprise. Id. The Committee further
stated: "The practice of law is not a business which can be bought or sold." Id.
1536 [Vol. 40: p. 1517
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 5 [1995], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol40/iss5/5
soliciting another lawyer's clients, restrictive covenants are unnecessary. 12
It is noteworthy that in its discussion, the Committee emphasized the dele-
terious effects such a covenant would have on lawyers, but failed to discuss
the effects on clients.'
1 3
One year later, the Committee temporarily reconsidered its stance.'
14
Reasoning that the ban on restrictive covenants applied only in the em-
ployment context (i.e., as to employment agreements between an em-
ployer/partner and an employee/associate), the Committee held that the
per se ban was inapplicable to agreements between partners.1 15 The Com-
mittee reached this conclusion because it believed that partners were on
'equal footing" with each other in the legal arena.1 16 The Committee sub-
sequently reversed this decision, however, and applied the per se ban on
restrictive covenants to all attorneys in Informal Opinion 1072.117
In this informal opinion, the ABA Committee emphasized the client's
freedom of choice.' 18 Justifying the imposition of a per se ban on lawyer
noncompetition agreements, the Committee stated, without substantia-
tion, that such agreements "[t]end to interfere with and obstruct the free-
dom of the client in choosing and dealing with his lawyer."'1 19 The virtual
per se ban on lawyer advertising and solicitation currently advocated by
the Committee, however, contravenes the rather long line of Supreme
Court cases upholding lawyers' First Amendment right to truthful advertis-
ing and solicitation.1 20 The courts have relied on language in both the
112. Id.
113. See Penasack, supra note 6, at 892.




117. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 1072
(1968) (rejecting employee-partner distinction). The opinion concluded that "at-
torneys should not engage in an attempt to barter clients, nor should their prac-
tice be restricted. The attorney must remain free to practice when and where he
will and to be available to prospective clients who might desire to engage his serv-
ices." Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. For a general discussion of the case law addressing the per se rule
against restrictive covenants in lawyer employment agreements, see Penasack,
supra note 6, at 889-904.
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Model Code 121 and the Model Rules 122 to invalidate restrictive covenants
in attorney partnership agreements.1 23
Courts proscribing the use of restrictive covenants by attorneys have
drawn a distinction between lawyers and all other professionals who re-
main free to agree to restrictive covenants limiting their professional prac-
tice.124 There are two primary justifications proffered for treating lawyers
121. MODEL CODE, supra note 14, at DR 2-108. This section states:
(A) A lawyer shall not be a party to or participate in a partnership or
employment agreement with another lawyer that restricts the right
of a lawyer to practice law after the termination of a relationship
created by the agreement, except as a condition to payment of retire-
ment benefits.
(B) In connection with the settlement of a controversy or suit, a lawyer
shall not enter into an agreement that restricts his right to practice
law.
Id.
122. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 14, at Rule 5.6. This Rule provides that:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership or employment agreement that restricts the rights of a
lawyer to practice after termination of the relationship, except an
agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or
(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice
is part of the settlement of a controversy between private parties.
Id. The comment to Rule 5.6 further states that "[a]n agreement restricting the
right of partners or associates to practice after leaving a firm not only limits their
professional autonomy but also limits the freedom of clients to choose a lawyer."
Id. at Rule 5.6 cmt.
123. See, e.g., Anderson v. Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, 461
N.W.2d 598, 603 (Iowa 1990) (holding that provision calling for forfeiture of part-
nership interest after causing "detriment" to firm by withdrawing and competing
was void); Meehan v. Shaughnessy, 535 N.E.2d 1255, 1262-63 (Mass. 1989) (find-
ing restrictive agreement permitting subsequent representation of firm's clients by
departing partners violative of ethical rule); Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Mar-
cus, 607 A.2d 142, 146-47 (NJ. 1992) (ruling that agreement barring compensa-
tion to withdrawing partners who represent clients of former firm within one year
of departure was void); Dwyer v.Jung, 336 A.2d 498 (NJ. Super. Ch. Div.) (holding
covenant not to represent former firm's clients void), aff'd, 348 A.2d 208 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975); Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 417 (N.Y.
1989) (holding that agreement conditioning payment of departing partner's share
of net profits was void); Gray v. Martin, 663 P.2d 1285, 1290-91 (Or. 1983) (ruling
agreement forfeiting withdrawal payments if withdrawing partner practices law in
certain geographical area was void); Hagen v. O'Connell, Goyak & Ball, 683 P.2d
563, 565 (Or. App. 1984) (determining noncompetition agreement was void);
Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith, P.C., 811 S.W.2d 528, 529-30 (Tenn. 1991)
(voiding agreement calling for forfeiture of equity and deferred compensation for
departing partner who continues to practice law); Cohen v. Graham, 722 P.2d
1388, 1390-92 (Wash. App. 1986) (holding that agreement not to represent for-
mer firm's clients was unenforceable).
124. Dwyer, 336 A.2d at 500. ("Commercial standards may not be used to eval-
uate the reasonableness of lawyer restrictive covenants. Strong public policy con-
siderations preclude their applicability."); see also MODEL CODE, supra note 14, at
DR 2-108(A). Based upon this distinction, courts typically uphold restrictive cove-
nants involving, for example, physicians and accountants. See Perry v. Moran, 748
P.2d 224, 229 (Wash. 1987) ("A covenant prohibiting the former employee from
providing accounting services to the firm's clients for a reasonable time is a fair
1538
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differently.125 First, doing so is thought to ensure that the public has an
unrestricted pool of attorneys from which to choose legal counsel. 126 Sec-
ond, this approach protects attorneys from bargaining away their right to
practice on their own after leaving an employer.12 7 Based on these con-
cerns, authorities have held that ordinary commercial standards do not
apply when evaluating the reasonableness of lauyer anticompetition cove-
nants. 128 Given the issues confronting a practicing lawyer today, however,
it is questionable whether such a distinction is reasonable. 129
means of protecting that client base."). Many commentators, however, have been
puzzled by the lack of principled distinction given the longstanding existence of
the per se ban on lawyer restrictive covenants. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HILLMAN, LAw
FIRM BREAKUPS § 2.3.3, at 29 (1990) ("The reasons for distinguishing lawyering
from other professions in this context are vague, and it is questionable whether the
availability of choice for the client is any less critical when the professional en-
gaged is a physician .... ").
For a discussion of approaches of other professions to restrictive covenants
and an argument that the per se ban on restrictive covenants imposed on the legal
profession is unreasonable, see Stephen E. Kalish, Covenants Not to Compete and the
Legal Profession, 29 ST. Louis U. L.J. 423, 424-45, 450-56 (1985).
125. ABA/BNA MANUAL, supra note 35, at 51:1201. A third justification is
that restrictive covenants lead to a bartering of clients. Id.
126. See Dwyer, 336 A.2d at 501. (invalidating restrictive covenant where it con-
flicted with client's "unlimited choice of counsel"); Hagen, 683 P.2d at 565 (" [Such
a] disciplinary rule is designed to 'govern the relationships between attorneys for
the protection of the public."' (quoting Gray v. Martin, 663 P.2d 1285, 1290 (Or.
1983))); ABA/BNA MANUAL, supra note 35, at 901:2307 (finding that covenant
requiring attorney "not to disrupt, impair or interfere with the business of the firm
in any way, whether by way of interfering with or raiding its employees, or dis-
rupting or interfering with the firm's relationship with its clients," under penalty of
injunctive relief and $150,000 liquidated damages, was "grossly overreaching,"
"truly oppressive" and violative of DR 2-103(A)) (summarizing District of Colum-
bia, Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 181 at 11-14 (undated)).
127. MODEL RULES, supra note 14, at Rule 5.6 (expressly forbidding lawyers
from entering into agreements that restrict their right to practice law).
128. ABA/BNA MANUAL, supra note 35, at 901:2307 (finding that in terrorem
effect would inhibit lawyer from pursuing his or her profession) (summarizing Dis-
trict of Columbia Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 181 (undated)). Similarly, liquidated
damages intended to reimburse a former employer for lost good will of clients
choosing to retain a departing attorney was found to be unethical. Id. at 901:4754
(summarizing State Bar of Mich. Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op.
CI-1145 (1986)).
129. HILLMAN, supra note 3, § 2.3.3, at 29. Hillman suggests that the distinc-
tion made between the law and other professions is one without a difference: "The
reasons for distinguishing lawyering from any other profession in this context are
vague, and it is questionable whether the availability of choice for the client is any
less critical when the professional engaged is a physician." Id. Accord Haight,
Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Court, 324 Cal. App. 3d 963, 971 (Ct. App. 1991)
("We find no reason to treat attorneys any differently from professionals such as
physicians or certified public accountants .... ); Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550
N.E.2d 410, 418 (N.Y. 1989) (Hancock, J., dissenting) ("If the agreement per-
tained to any other business or profession, there would be no question that the
parties would be held to their bargain.") (citation omitted).
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Duyer v. Jung3 0 is one of the earliest cases dealing with restrictive cov-
enants in attorney partnership agreements. The disputed partnership
agreement in Duyer provided that upon dissolution, clients would be di-
vided among partners of the firm.13 ' Disregarding the typical balancing
test applicable to doctors, accountants and other professionals, the Duyer
court held that the agreement was void because it violated the public pol-
icy protecting clients' freedom of choice in legal representation.13 2 In an
attempt to justify its decision, the Dwyer court stated that, "[c) ommercial
standards may not be used to evaluate the reasonableness of lawyer restric-
tive covenants. Strong public policy considerations preclude their applica-
bility."1 3 3 Commentators have expressed their disdain for the Dwyer
decision, criticizing the court's devotion to archaic ideals of the legal
profession.13 4
A few years later, the New York Supreme Court, in Cohen v. Lord, Day
& Lord,135 refused to enforce a clause that conditioned receipt of earned,
but uncollected, partnership profits on an agreement not "to practice law
in any state or other jurisdiction in which the [p]artnership maintains an
office or any contiguous jurisdiction." 136 Although it recognized that the
130. 336 A.2d 498 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd, 348 A.2d 208 (NJ. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1975).
131. Id. at 499. Specifically, the agreement contained the following provision:
Should the partnership terminate, all clients listed in exhibit "A" shall be
designated to certain individual partners. Upon termination, and by vir-
tue of this Agreement, all partners shall be restricted from doing business
with a client designated as that of another partner for a period of 5 (five)
years.
Id.
132. Id. at 501. The Dryer court opined that "an agreement dividing the cli-
ent market and prohibiting attorneys from representing certain [clients] . . . has
the effect of restricting those [clients] in their unlimited choice of counsel." Id.
133. Id. at 500. The court created a category of "lawyer restrictive covenants"
that would be judged not by the usual commercial standards, but rather by ethical
standards. Id. at 499. Although the court justified its decision on the principle of
client choice, it failed to explain why the choice of a lawyer's client warranted any
more protection than that of a doctor or accountant. Id.
134. See, e.g., Note, Attorneys Must Not Enter Into Partnership Agreements Prohibit-
ing Themselves From Representing Former Clients Upon Termination of the Partnership, 4
FOPtRDAm URB. L.J. 195, 207-09 (1975) (criticizing Dwyer court's refusal to enforce
restrictive covenant in partnership agreement).
135. 550 N.E.2d 410 (N.Y. 1989).
136. Id. at 411. Reversing the decision of the Appellate Division, the Cohen
court stated:
We hold that while the provision in question does not expressly or com-
pletely prohibit a withdrawing partner from engaging in the practice of
law, the significant monetary penalty it exacts, if the withdrawing partner
practices competitively with the former firm, constitutes an impermissible
restriction on the practice of law. The forfeiture-for-competition provi-
sion would functionally and realistically discourage and foreclose a with-
drawing partner from serving clients who might wish to continue to be
represented by the withdrawing lawyer and would thus interfere with the
client's choice of counsel.
1540
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provision did not preclude an attorney from practicing law completely, the
court held that the "significant monetary penalty" resulting from the pro-
vision's enforcement would ultimately interfere with clients' freedom of
choice.137 The Cohen decision put to rest the notion that financial forfeit-
ures would necessarily survive scrutiny under the disciplinary rules.138
Since the Cohen ruling, most courts have held that all restrictive covenants
between lawyers are unethical and against public policy.
13 9
Not all courts, however, follow the Cohen approach. The first court to
decide counter to Cohen was California's Second District Court of Appeals
in Haight, Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Court.140 In Haight, the court en-
forced a covenant that provided for the forfeiture of withdrawal benefits if
a partner subsequently competed with the firm.1 41 Although the court
recognized the primacy of client choice, it refused to hold that public pol-
137. Id.
138. Id. at 411. Judge Hancock, in his dissent, disagreed with the majority's
concern with the attorney's financial well-being. Id. at 417 (Hancock, J., dissent-
ing). He emphasized that the concern behind the ethical standard was for the
client: "Restrictions which somehow interfere with or restrict the freedom of pres-
ent or future clients to hire and fire lawyers are what the rule aims to prohibit." Id.
139. See, e.g., Anderson v. Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner & Engberg, 461
N.W.2d 598, 602 (Iowa 1990) (holding that partnership attempted to penalize at-
torney for his clients' decisions to follow him, stating that "his freedom to withdraw
cannot be abrogated by the monetary penalty the firm has attempted to exact");
Jacob v. Norris, McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 143 (N.J. 1992) (finding that
termination agreement's provision discouraging withdrawing partners from con-
tacting firm's professional and paraprofessional staff violated public policy); Cohen,
550 N.E.2d at 410 ("A law firm partnership agreement which conditions payment
of earned but uncollected partnership revenues upon a withdrawing partner's obli-
gation to refrain from the practice of law in competition with the former law firm
restricts the practice of law in violation of Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A) . . . and is
unenforceable in these circumstances as against public policy."); Gray v. Martin,
663 P.2d 1285, 1290 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that loss of benefits is "certainly a
restriction on the attorney's right to practice"); Spiegel v. Thomas, Mann & Smith,
P.C., 811 S.W.2d 528, 531 (Tenn. 1991) (holding that financial disincentive clause
incorporated into Tennessee Supreme Court rules violated DR 2-108).
140. 234 Cal. App. 3d 963, 966-67 (1991).
141. Id. The covenants at issue in the relevant partnership agreement read:
[E]ach Partner agrees that, if he withdraws or voluntarily retires from the
Partnership, he will not engage in any area of the practice of law regularly
practiced by the law firm and in so doing represent or become associated
with any firm that represents any client represented by this law firm
within a twelve (12) month period prior to said person leaving the firm,
within the Counties of Los Angeles, Ventura, Orange, Riverside or San
Bernardino nor with any City in such Counties for a period of three (3)
years from the date of withdrawal or retirement, so long as continuing
members of this firm engage in practice in the same areas of law.
A Partner ... may violate [the section set forth immediately above]. How-
ever, by so doing, he forfeits any and all rights and interests, financial and
otherwise, to which he would otherwise be thereafter entitled as a depart-
ing Partner under the terms of this Agreement.
Id. Adherence to these provisions relieves a withdrawing partner from liability for
debt incurred while with the firm. Id.
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icy required lawyers to be treated differently than other professionals. 1 42
Broadly interpreting the California Rules, 143 which codified the Model
Rules, the court held that the Rules proscribed only agreements providing
for an outright ban on competition and, as such, did not apply to covenants
merely requiring the departing partner to "compensate his former part-
ners."1 44 The court emphasized the importance of the distinction be-
tween covenants containing outright competitive proscriptions and
agreements anticipating and resolving competition issues upon firm disso-
lution. 145 In the Haight court's opinion, the latter should be enforced if
designed to protect legitimate interests of the law firm.146
In December 1993, another California decision, Howard v. Babcock,14 7
again broke with nationwide precedent. The majority in Howard first ana-
lyzed the law of restrictive covenants as applied to businesses in general.' 48
Based on the language of the general partnership statute, which allowed
"any partner" to enter into a reasonable restrictive covenant, the Howard
court failed to find any indication or intent to provide an exception for
lawyers. 149 In fact, the Howard court acknowledged that the comments to
the original California Civil Code explicitly included lawyers.15 0 Although
142. Id. at 971. Specifically, the Haight court refused to "place lawyers in a
class apart from other business and professional partnerships." Id.
143. CALIFORNIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1-500 (West Supp.
1993). Rule 1-500 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct states:
A member shall not be a party to or participate in offering or making an
agreement, whether in connection with the settlement of a lawsuit or
otherwise, if the agreement restricts the right of a member to practice
law, except that this rule shall not prohibit such an agreement which:
(1) Is a part of an employment, shareholders', or partnership agreement
among members provided the restrictive agreement does not survive the
termination of the employment, shareholder or partnership relationship;
or
(2) Requires payments to a member upon the member's retirement
from the practice of law.
Id.
144. Haight, 234 Cal. App. 3d at 969.
145. Id. The Haight court stated that the partnership agreement provisions,
on their face, "do not expressly or completely prohibit the ... partners from en-
gaging in the practice of law, or from representing any client." Id. As such, the
provisions result in an outright ban on competition. Id.
146. Id. The Haight court held that the ethical code at issue required respect
not only for the client, but also for the relations among attorneys. Id.
147. 863 P.2d 150 (Cal. 1993).
148. Id. at 154. The Howard court recognized the state's established law that
"a partnership agreement may provide against competition by withdrawing part-
ners in a limited geographical area." Id.
149. Id. at 157. The Howard court agreed with the Haight court and
"declar[ed] an agreement between law partners that a reasonable cost will be as-
sessed for competition is consistent with [the applicable ethical rule]." Id. at 156.
150. Id. at 155. The Howard court stated that "[w] hile it may be true that...
when [the statute] ... was enacted, it was not customary for lawyers to enter into
noncompetition agreements, we do not view this historical circumstance as creat-
ing for all time an unspoken exception to the statute." Id.
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it recognized its authority to impose higher standards of conduct under
the professional rules of conduct,15 1 the Howard court remained confident
that both the interests of the public and the legitimate business interests
of law firms 152 were protected by enforcing reasonable restrictive
covenants.
153
The Howard court further defended its decision based on the occur-
rence of what it termed "a revolution in the practice of law," that required
the "economic interests of the law firm to be protected as they are in other
business enterprises." 154 Because of these "sweeping changes" in the pro-
fession, the court felt justified in abolishing the per se rule banning non-
competition agreements among law partners. 155 Accordingly, the case was
remanded for examination under the "rule of reason" test applicable to
noncompetition agreements between business partners generally. 15 6
.The sole dissenting justice, Justice Kennard, argued in support of the
traditional per se ban on restrictive covenants. 15 7 Justice Kennard empha-
sized that despite the perceived "revolution" in the legal profession, the
law was still first and foremost a profession, and that lawyers should con-
tinue to strive for the highest ethical standards.' 5 8 Further, Justice Ken-
nard opined that an attorney's fiduciary duty to clients directs that a
151. Id.
152. Id. at 160. The Howard court recognized that "important business inter-
ests of law firms [could] no longer be ignored." Id. at 157. In particular, the court
referenced a firm's "financial interest in the continued patronage of its clientele."
Id. (citing Kalish, supra note 124, at 438).
153. Id. The court felt assured that its decision sought to balance "the inter-
ests of clients in having the attorneys of choice, and the interest of law firms in a
stable business environment." Id. Dismissing the concerns of the dissent, the How-
ard majority stated:
It is not our intent to relegate clients to the position of commodities, nor
to elevate commercial concerns over the lawyer's bedrock duty of loyal
and vigorous advocacy on behalf of the client. Rather, we have exercised
our duty to regulate the practice of law with a care to understanding the
world as it is, uninfluenced by rhetoric that appears to obscure, rather
than clarify, the problem.
Id. at 160-61.
154. Id. at 156. The Howard court further opined: "We are confident that our
recognition of a new reality in the practice of law will have no deleterious effect on
the current ability of clients to retain loyal, competent counsel of their choice." Id.
at 156-57.
155. Id. at 160. The court went on to hold that, "an agreement among part-
ners imposing a reasonable cost on departing partners who compete with the law
firm in a limited geographical area is not.., void on its face as against public
policy." Id.
156. Id. at 161.
157. Id. at 161-66 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 161 (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("Although the law is a business in
the sense that an attorney in a law firm earns a living by practicing law, it is also
and foremost a profession, with all the responsibilities that word implies."). Again,
the Howard dissent fails to explain any substantive difference between attorneys
and other professionals (e.g., doctors or accountants) to account for the height-
ened scrutiny imposed upon attorneys.
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client's right to choose counsel is paramount to any interest of either
the attorney or the law firm.159 In her view, the majority opinion
subordinated the client's rights to the monetary interests of law firms and,
consequently, weakened ethical standards as well as the integrity of the
legal profession.16 0
Attorneys practicing law today are confronting new and complex is-
sues due, in large part, to increased mobility within the legal profession.
The rights of clients in choosing counsel and the rights of attorneys in
choosing where and for whom to practice must be appropriately balanced
when considering the proper scope of attorney solicitation as well as the
enforceability of restrictive covenants. The present ethical rules never
contemplated these concerns, and thus, rather than providing guidance in
this area, the rules only muddy the waters. Courts grappling with an ap-
propriate resolution must carefully weigh all the issues in order to reach a
decision that is truly fair-even if doing so would require the rejection of
certain traditional ideals which, viewed in today's standards, simply are
unworkable.
III. ATTORNEY SOLICITATION & USE OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS: THE
PROPER SCOPE OF ETHICAL RULES
The problem of bringing clients and lawyers together on a mutually fair
basis, consistent with the public interest, is as old as the profession itself
It is one of considerable complexity, especially in view of the constantly
evolving nature of the need for legal services. The problem has not been
resolved with complete satisfaction despite diligent and thoughtful efforts
by the organized bar and others over a period of many years, and there is
no reason to believe that today's best answer will be responsive to future
needs. 16 '
A. Attorney Solicitation
Excessive restrictions on a departing attorney's right to communicate
with firm clients are inconsistent with the policies underlying Supreme
Court precedent. The Court's First Amendment case law with respect to
attorney solicitation instructs that an attorney has the right to contact any-
one, including clients of a former firm, in writing.1 62 Furthermore, the
159. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting) ("The ethical rule that this court is called
upon to interpret exists to enforce the traditional and sound view that service to
clients, including protection of the clients' ability to employ the attorneys they
have come to trust, is more important than safeguarding the economic interests of
established attorneys and law firms.").
160. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
161. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 402-03 (1977) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
162. For a discussion of permissible solicitation under the First Amendment,
see supra notes 75-100 and accompanying text.
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Court's decisions make it clear that a substantial public interest supports
the free flow of information to consumers concerning legal services. 163 As
one commentator noted: "[Because] individual[s are] constantly con-
fronted with the necessity of making life-affecting decisions[, they] should
have available a free flow of information upon which to base those deci-
sions.... [Therefore,] there must be not only a freedom to speak but also
a freedom to hear."164 Thus, the client's "need to know" and related public
interests must be the principle concern when attempting to ascertain the
appropriate scope of solicitation by attorneys. The mere availability of
truthful advertising, however, is only the first step. Concomitant with this,
a client must be educated as to the existence of the right to choose repre-
sentation and the consequences of such a right so that he or she can truly
make an informed choice.
Attorneys, therefore, must remain free to advise clients of their right
to discharge one lawyer and substitute another, given that such informa-
tion is truthful-especially in light of the fact that a client represented by
an attorney involved in a firm breakup is often in a vulnerable position.
Various authorities support the view that laypersons are entitled to mate-
rial information bearing on the all-important decision of who shall repre-
sent them.165 The bar has long recognized that an attorney has an ethical
obligation to "[p]rovide information relevant to the selection of the most
appropriate counsel." 166 Attorney conduct in the context of departures
163. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985)
(stating that "the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough tojustify
imposing on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the
false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the harmful"); Bates,
433 U.S. at 364 (reasoning that commercial speech serves individual and societal
interests in informed and reliable decision-making); see also In re Felmeister & Is-
sacs, 518 A.2d 188, 192-93 (N.J. 1986) ("The public would be well served by more
information about the legal system in order to know its legal rights and to help it
choose a lawyer to enforce those rights .... All members of society, not just the
direct recipients and users of the messages, benefit from attorney advertising.").
164. Vernon R. Pearson & Michael O'Neill, The First Amendment, Commercial
Speech, and the Advertising Lauyer, 9 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 293, 303 (1985-86)
(emphasis added).
165. See ABA/BNA MANUAL ETHICS Ops. (1986-1990), supra note 35, at
901:1601 (acknowledging client's right to "informed choice of counsel" (emphasis
added)); ABA/BNA MANUAL ETHICS OPS. (1980-1985), supra note 35, at 801:3203
("A lawyer who terminates his association with a firm ... may not insist on taking
all active cases which came to him directly or because of earlier services rendered
by him. Because the taking would result in a termination of employment, this
client retains the right to decide on his counsel after full disclosure of all necessary
information."); see also Lori B. Andrews, The Model Rules and Advertising, 68 A.BA. J.
808, 809 (July 1982) ("Lawyer advertising at its best can inform people about their
legal rights and help them to make an informed choice of attorneys to exercise
those rights.... Lawyers have won the right to advertise, in part so that the public can
obtain needed information about the identification of legal problems and the nature,
availability, and uses of legal services." (emphasis added)).
166. MODEL CODE, supra note 14, at EC-2-2; see also MODEL CODE, supra note
14, at EC-2-1 (stating that important function "of the legal profession [is] ... to
facilitate the process of intelligent selection of lawyers"); MODEL CODE, supra note
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and firm dissolutions must be resolved with the "best interests of the client
in mind."167 Concern with the client's right to choose its counsel not only
permits, but requires, open discussion between departing attorneys and
their clients regarding the options available to them with respect to
representation.
In line with this view, one commentator has suggested that when a
departing partner communicates with a client, traditional fiduciary obliga-
tions must give way to "special principles." 168 This view appropriately em-
phasizes the preeminence of a client's right of free choice of counsel, but
not at the expense of attorney mobility. The conflict of interest provisions
of both the Model Code' 69 and the Model Rules 170 support this view, ad-
vising that clients are entitled to the undivided loyalty of their attorney.
Thus, it follows that whenever a departing attorney believes, in good faith,
that the interests of his or her client will best be served by pre-departure
disclosure of relevant facts, that attorney should not be precluded from
communicating those facts due to conflicting firm obligations.
The absurdity of a contrary view is illustrated in Adler, Barish. In that
case, the court chose to place a rather onerous burden on the client. The
client must first recognize his or her right to continue or discontinue legal
representation with the attorney's former firm and then, the client must
decide what representation is in his or her best interest.1 7' It is entirely
unreasonable and unrealistic, however, to assume that a brief written an-
nouncement stating nothing more than a partner's withdrawal from a firm
adequately preserves a client's freedom to choose his or her own counsel.
It is highly unlikely that a client will inquire or take any further action
upon receiving such a terse departure announcement from the attorney
or the attorney's firm. When the attorney leaves without offering a suffi-
cient explanation for the departure, the client may feel poorly treated or
even abandoned. Regardless of the precise reason behind the lack of in-
14, at EC 7-8 (requiring counsel to "exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of
his client are made only after the client has been informed of relevant
considerations").
167. See MODEL CODE, supra note 14, at EC 7-9 (requiring counsel to act "in
manner consistent with the best interests of his client"). It is important to keep in
mind the Supreme Court's views that paternalism is inappropriate because "'peo-
ple will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed."'
Bates, 433 U.S. at 365 (quoting with approval Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
168. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 13, at 556 (discussing viable alternatives to
per se ban on attorneys' use of restrictive covenants).
169. See MODEL CODE, supra note 14, at DR 5-101 (addressing conflict of inter-
est issues).
170. See MODEL RULES, supra note 14, at Rule 1.9 (addressing conflict of inter-
est issues).
171. Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoffv. Epstein, 393 A.2d 1175, 1192
(Pa. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 907 (1979). For a discussion of Adler, Barish, see
supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
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quiry, clients, through no fault of their own, will be deprived of important
information relevant to a choice of counsel decision.
Similarly, a firm's reassignment of a client file, upon the withdrawal of
the client's former attorney, to another lawyer does not adequately protect
the client's interest. Because the legal system is complex, the law cannot
require the layperson-client to discover all relevant rights and conse-
quences of attorney action or inaction. A client is often unaware of the
effects of attorney departure or reassignment, and therefore, the client's
interests would be served only by allowing full, unsolicited discussion of
their full impact. Reassignment does not substitute for free communica-
tion of facts relevant to the client's decision as to his or her future
representation.
B. Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants
A great majority of courts have ruled against the enforceability of re-
strictive covenants in lawyers' partnership agreements. For example, the
Adler, Barish court, espousing a restrictive approach, left Adler, Barish's
clients in a vulnerable position-having to make important decisions re-
garding their future legal representation without any knowledge of the
available alternatives or the ramifications of any such choice. In contrast,
courts adopting contrary views, such as the Howard court, offer a careful
balancing of clients' needs and attorneys' concerns.
The well-reasoned rationale announced in Howard provides a sound
basis for concluding that legal and ethical ideals authorize the use of re-
strictive covenants by lawyers-at least those agreements anticipating com-
petition.1 7 2 Acknowledging the vulnerability of the contemporary law
firm, the California Supreme Court recognized that modern realities ne-
cessitate change in order to protect the business interests of law firms.'
73
The Howard court reasoned that if the law failed to permit law firms to
protect their financial interests-most importantly, their client base-law-
yers may become unwilling to refer clients to, or to promote the practice
of, their partners.1 7 4 The court found such a result particularly undesir-
172. Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 160 (Cal. 1993). For a discussion of
the Howard case, see supra notes 147-60 and accompanying text.
173. Id. The Howard court expressed confidence that its decision would not
adversely effect clients' choice of counsel:
It is not our intent to relegate clients to the position of commodities, nor
to elevate commercial concerns over the lawyer's bedrock duty of loyal
and vigorous advocacy on behalf of the client. Rather, we have exercised
our duty to regulate the practice of law with a care to understanding the
world as it is, uninfluenced by rhetoric that appears to obscure, rather
than clarify, the problem. We are confident that our opinion will leave
the lawyer's professional duties to his or her clients undisturbed, and that
clients will enjoy the same degree of choice in retaining attorneys as they
have always possessed.
Id. at 160-61.
174. Id. The Howard court further opined: "In addition, parmerships may be
less willing to invest monies necessary to provide the equipment, library and other
19951 COMMENT 1547
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able given increased specialization throughout the profession. 175 As the
current highly-competitive legal environment undermines many assump-
tions driving traditional ethical requirements, the law with respect to
restrictive covenants should be re-examined in order to recognize these
changes.
Indeed, the Howard court discounted the import advanced by many
courts in distinguishing lawyers from other professionals. 1 76 The court
dismissed previously preferred justifications for the disparate treatment as
lacking a principled distinction. 177 It is undisputed that all professionals
have an interest in personal autonomy. In addition, doctors and other
professionals develop close relationships with their patients and clients
and, like attorneys, owe their patients and clients a high duty of skill and
loyalty. 178 Furthermore, clients choose all professionals based on a profes-
sional's training, skill, experience and integrity. If protecting clients' free-
dom of choice and attorneys' autonomy are predominant concerns of the
courts in refusing to enforce restrictive covenants between attorneys, then
arguably restrictive covenants between doctors should be equally unen-
forceable. Indeed, the special trust patients place in their physicians mer-
its as much, if not more, restraint in enforcing covenants which hinder the
patient-doctor relationship than that which may hinder the attorney-client
relationship. 179 Thus, the application of a per se ban on attorney advertis-
ing, to the exclusion of physician advertising, is somewhat nonsensical.
resources necessary to serve a client well if a partner could both leave a firm free of
the mutually incurred liability, and also take the future income of the firm." Id.
(citing Penasack, supra note 6, at 890-91).
175. Id. The court specifically observed that, "[iln an environment of perva-
sive lateral hiring, partners may be loath to financially or otherwise support the
development of a colleague's relations with particular clients because the col-
league may later exclusively usurp the benefits of that relationship." Id. at 160.
176. Id. at 159-60. The court drew the following analogy:
It seems to us unreasonable to distinguish lawyers from other profession-
als such as doctors or accountants, who also owe a high degree of skill
and loyalty to their patients and clients. The interest of a patient in a
doctor of his or her choice is obviously as significant as the interest of a
litigant in a lawyer of his or her choosing. Yet for doctors, reasonable
noncompetition agreements binding upon withdrawing partners are
permitted.
Id. at 160.
177. Id. The Howard court further advised:
[T]he contemporary changes in the legal profession to which we have
already alluded make the assertion that the practice of law is not compa-
rable to a business unpersuasive and unreflective of reality. Commercial
concerns are now openly recognized as important in the practice of
law.... In any event, no longer can it be said that law is a profession
apart, untouched by the marketplace.
Id. at 159.
178. Id. at 160.
179. Id. Recently, the New York Times reported that "Americans really value
choice in their medical care .... which is why we have seen the development of
P.P.O.'s [preferred provider organizations] and P.O.S.'s [point of service net-
works] which are now all the rage." Rob Seitz, The Political Tea Leaves Point to Medi-
1548
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Justice Kennard's dissent in Howard illustrates the inefficacy of the
argument in favor of the per se approach to restrictive covenants. In her
dissenting opinion, she stressed that ethics regulations seek to protect the
public, not the monetary interests of law firms.180 She failed to explain,
however, how the majority's decision would necessarily result in injury to
the public. In fact, Justice Kennard's assertions amount to nothing more
than "rationalization, not reasoning"-the very accusation she charged
against the majority.1 8 ' Moreover, Judge Kennard posited that lawyers
should not follow the same rules as other businesses because the ethics of
other professions fail to assimilate the ethical duties imposed upon law-
yers.182 Failing to expound on the distinct differences-or the import of
those differences-she asserted simply and conclusively, that "the nature,
ideals, and practices of the various professions are different.' 83
From this discussion, it is apparent that the per se ban on restrictive
covenants contained in attorney partnership agreements makes no sense
today. Further, the per se ban is unsupported by any express ethical rule.
Despite these realities, however, numerous courts continue to cite Model
Rule 5.6 and its counterpart in the Model Code as authority for the impo-
sition of a per se ban. 184 The Haight and Howard cases, as well as the
thoughtful dissent in Cohen, attack the interpretation of these ethical rules
as an absolute bar to the enforcement of restrictive covenants in lawyers'
partnership agreements.' 8 5 Interpreting the rules in light of modern real-
ities faced by the legal profession, the emerging minority view against per
se prohibition appropriately finds that the rule proscribes only a total prohi-
bition on the practice of law in any given geographical area. 186
cal Networks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1992, sec. 3 at 10. Americans favor these
alternative plans in order to avoid the "tight restrictions of traditional health main-
tenance organizations [HMOs]." Id.
180. Howard, 863 P.2d at 165 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
182. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). Although Justice Kennard acknowledges
that "law firms have a financial interest in their clientele," she discounts the import
of this interest by stating that, "the purpose of rules of professional ethics is to
restrain and guide the conduct of attorneys and to protect the public, not to pro-
tect the financial interests of law firms." Id.
183. Id. at 166 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard rejects the signifi-
cance of an analogy drawn between lawyers and other professionals: "Although
other businesses and professions permit noncompetition agreements, the rules ap-
plicable to other professions do not necessarily provide guidance for the legal pro-
fession." Id.
184. For a list of cases, see supra note 123 and accompanying text. See also
Penasack, supra note 6, at 904 (stating that Model Rule 5.6 was "designed to incor-
porate and perpetuate the per se rule").
185. For a discussion of the decisions in Haight and Cohen, see supra notes
135-60 and accompanying text.
186. As one court explained: "[No legal justification and no basis in fairness
or logic exists [which would] permit a lawyer who accepted and benefitted from [a
restrictive covenant] for twenty years to then repudiate it." Cohen v. Lord, Day &
Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 414 (N.Y. 1989).
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Finally, it remains unchallenged that the primary consideration in de-
termining the enforceability of a restrictive covenant must be clients' free-
dom to choose their own counsel. Clearly, attorneys may not agree to
divide their clientele upon dissolution-at least not without client input
and approval. Financial remedial provisions and similar covenants provid-
ing for other than outright bans on competition should be enforced, as
they do not adversely affect the firm's clients or their absolute right to
choose their own counsel.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators agree that clients are not commodities with
which attorneys can barter. Likewise, one must not discount the impor-
tance of a client's absolute right to freedom of choice in legal representa-
tion-a choice that is meaningless if it is not made with the benefit of any
and all relevant information that may impact the client's ultimate deci-
sion. It would be foolhardy to put the burden on the unsuspecting, unso-
phisticated layperson, as client, to be aware of the consequences of
retaining subsequent or terminating previous counsel or, in the first in-
stance, realizing that such an option is even available.
Finally, as law firms act more and more like businesses, proffered jus-
tifications for different treatment from other professions become less com-
pelling. Based on outdated mores of yesterday, distinctions between
lawyers and other professionals threaten to undermine the very principle
they purportedly seek to protect. Therefore, negotiated restrictive cove-
nants placed in partnership agreements, seeking to address legitimate is-
sues concerning rights of partners upon firm dissolution, should be held
enforceable. In an effort to avoid further discord within the legal profes-
sion, the rules of conduct should be re-examined in the context of the
modern practice and the pertinent issues faced by today's lawyers.' 87 Af-
ter all, the stability of the legal profession "depend [s] upon the integrity of
lawyers' dealings with each other."'18 8
Judy Royer May
187. Penasack, supra note 6, at 913. One commentator suggested a revised
Model Rule 5.6, which would allow agreements anticipating competition to be en-
forced. Id. at 913-14. Penasack's approach appropriately considers whether client
choice of representation is, in fact, threatened to be denied by enforcing reason-
able restrictive covenants in attorney partnership agreements.
188. Id. at 914.
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